Abstract-Cloud computing provides individuals and enterprises massive computing power and scalable storage capacities to support a variety of big data applications in domains like health care and scientific research, therefore more and more data owners are involved to outsource their data on cloud servers for great convenience in data management and mining. However, data sets like health records in electronic documents usually contain sensitive information, which brings about privacy concerns if the documents are released or shared to partially untrusted third-parties in cloud. A practical and widely used technique for data privacy preservation is to encrypt data before outsourcing to the cloud servers, which however reduces the data utility and makes many traditional data analytic operators like keyword-based top-k document retrieval obsolete. In this paper, we investigate the multi-keyword top-k search problem for big data encryption against privacy breaches, and attempt to identify an efficient and secure solution to this problem. Specifically, for the privacy concern of query data, we construct a special tree-based index structure and design a random traversal algorithm, which makes even the same query to produce different visiting paths on the index, and can also maintain the accuracy of queries unchanged under stronger privacy. For improving the query efficiency, we propose a group multi-keyword top-k search scheme based on the idea of partition, where a group of tree-based indexes are constructed for all documents. Finally, we combine these methods together into an efficient and secure approach to address our proposed top-k similarity search. Extensive experimental results on real-life data sets demonstrate that our proposed approach can significantly improve the capability of defending the privacy breaches, the scalability and the time efficiency of query processing over the state-of-the-art methods.
INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing has emerged as a disruptive trend in both IT industries and research communities recently, its salient characteristics like high scalability and pay-asyou-go fashion have enabled cloud consumers to purchase the powerful computing resources as services according to their actual requirements, such that cloud users have no longer need to worry about the wasting on computing resources and the complexity on hardware platform management [1] , [2] . Nowadays, more and more companies and individuals from a large number of big data applications have outsource their data and deploy their services into cloud servers for easy data management, efficient data mining and query processing tasks.
But when the companies and individuals enjoy these advantages in cloud computing, they also need to take the privacy concern of the outsourced data into account. Because data sets in many applications often contain sensitive information like e-mails, electronic health records and financial transaction records, when the data owner outsourcing such sensitive data to the cloud servers which are considered to be partially trusted, the data can be easily accessed and analyzed by cloud service providers illegally. Since the analysis of these data sets may provide profound insights into a number of key areas in society (such as e-research, healthcare, medical and government services), thus data owners need effective, scalable and privacy-preserving services before releasing their data to the cloud.
Data encryption has been widely used for data privacy preservation in data sharing scenarios, it refers to mathematical calculation and algorithmic scheme that transform plaintext into cyphertext, which is a non-readable form to unauthorized parties. A variety of data encryption models have been proposed [3] , [4] , [5] and they are used to encrypt the data before outsourcing to the cloud servers. However, applying these approaches for data encryption usually cause tremendous cost in terms of data utility, which makes traditional data processing methods that are designed for plaintext data no longer work well over encrypted data.
The keyword-based search is such one widely used data operator in many database and information retrieval applications, and its traditional processing methods cannot be directly applied to encrypted data. Therefore, how to process such queries over encrypted data and at the same time guarantee data privacy becomes a hot research topic. Fortunately, many methodologies based on searchable encryption have been studied. For example, [6] , [7] , [8] deal with the single keyword search, and works [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] support the multi-keyword boolean search. However, the single keyword search is not smart enough to support advanced queries and the boolean search is unrealistic since it causes high communication cost. Therefore, more recent works like [14] , [15] , [16] focus on the multikeyword ranked search, which is more practical in pay-asyou-go cloud paradigm. But most of these methods cannot meet the high search efficiency and the strong data security simultaneously, especially when applying them to big data encryption poses great scalability and efficiency challenges.
Motivated by this, in this paper, we focus on a special type of multi-keyword ranked search, namely the multikeyword top-k search, which has been a very popular database operator in many important applications, and only needs to return the k documents with the highest relevance scores. For supporting multi-keyword search, we introduce the vector space model which represents documents and queries as vectors. In order to support top-k search, the relevance scores between documents and queries should be calculated, therefore, the TF×IDF (term frequency × inverse document frequency) model is introduced as a weighting rule to compute the relevance scores for ranking purposes.
In addition, to improve the query efficiency for better user experiences, we propose a group multi-keyword topk search scheme (GMTS), which is based on partition and supports top-k similarity search over encrypted data. In this scheme, the data owner divides the keywords in the dictionary (suppose that the dictionary contains all the keywords that could be extracted from all documents) into multiple groups and establishes a searchable index for each group. On the other side, to better control the size of indexes, we adopt champion lists [17] , [18] into our scheme, where the index of a keyword group only stores the top-ck documents of the corresponding keyword (the top-ck documents of a keyword represent the c * k documents that have the highest relevance scores to this keyword, where c is a positive integer). Furthermore, we propose a random traversal algorithm (RTRA) to strengthen the data security, where the data owner builds a binary tree as searchable index and assigns a random switch to each node, so the data user can assign a random key to each query. Therefore, the data user can change the results and visiting paths of queries by using different keys, which maintains high accuracy of queries. Finally, we combine the GMTS and the RTRA together into an efficient and secure solution to our proposed problem.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We first propose the random traversal algorithm which makes the cloud server randomly traverse on index and returns different results for the same query, and in the meantime, it maintains the accuracy of queries unchanged for higher security.
• Based on the random traversal algorithm, we present one both efficient and secure searchable encryption scheme, which can support top-k similarity search over encrypted data. In this scheme, the data owner can control the level of query unlinkability without sacrificing accuracy.
• Our experimental results show that our methods are more efficient than the state-of-the-art methods and can better protect data privacy. Especially, our proposed method has good scalability performance when dealing with large data sets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review and analyze the related works. Section 3 introduces the system model and threat model, the preliminaries and our design goals. The random traversal algorithm is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 describes the framework of the GMTS and describes the RGMTS framework in Section 6. Section 7 shows and analysis our experimental results. Section 8 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Searchable encryption (SE) is a hot research field, especially with the emergence of cloud computing. In this section, we review and analyze the existing searchable encryption schemes. SE can be divided into public key searchable encryption [4] , [9] , [19] , [20] and symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) [3] [7] , [8] according to different cryptography primitives. In this paper, we focuses on the symmetric searchable encryption because public key searchable encryption usually are computationally expensive [15] , [21] .
Abundant works [3] , [7] , [8] , [22] , [23] are proposed to deal with symmetric searchable encryption. Song et al. [6] first defined the problem of searching on encrypted data and proposed a symmetric searchable encryption scheme with linear complexity. After that, Goh et al. [7] formulated a security definition for SSE and proposed a secure index which is based on pseudo-random functions and Bloom filters, but the time cost of Goh's scheme is O(n). Curtmola et al. [3] introduced two formal definitions of SSE and proposed a method which is based on inverted list to improve the query performance, their method is proved to be more efficient than other works. However, most of these works can only support single keyword boolean search, which is not advanced enough to support complex functionalities. In recent years, many works have been proposed to achieve different kinds of complex queries like similarity search, multi-keyword search, etc. In general, the literatures [22] and [24] used wildcard-based techniques, [25] based on B edtree and [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] applied the locality sensitive hashing (LSH) to deal with similarity search. Works [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] support multi-keyword boolean search, but boolean search is inefficient because it returns all the documents that satisfy the query criteria. Hence, some recent works are proposed to deal with the bandwidth-saving multi-keyword ranked search [14] , [15] , [16] , [23] , [30] .
Cao et al. [15] proposed the multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted data for the first time and built a searchable index based on the vector space model, and chosen "coordinate matching" to measure the similarity between queries and documents. However, in their schemes, the time complexity of search is O(nm) (n is the number of keywords in dictionary, m is the size of the documents that stored in the cloud server), and the time complexity of trapdoor construction is also very high. Sun et al. [14] proposed a tree-based index structure which is based on the vector space model and the TF×IDF model. This structure achieves sub-linear time complexity, but it is vulnerable in protecting data privacy. One step further, Xia et al. [16] proposed a Greedy Depth-first Search tree-based searchable encryption scheme EDMRS, which achieved more efficiency than early works, but the cost of search remains high and the time complexity of creating trapdoor is high O(n 2 ). The works [14] , [15] , [16] add random numbers ξ j in indexes or queries to disturb the relevance scores between queries and documents, and they claimed that the value of ∑ ξ j can be adjusted to control the level of query unlinkability. But they can not protect the query unlinkability thoroughly, because in order to guarantee the accuracy of queries, the level of query unlinkability is usually get limited. Actually, the cloud server can easily link two identical queries by analyzing and comparing the results and visited paths. For instance, if the data user submits two identical queries to the cloud server, and sets the correct ratio to 80%. Even though the relevance scores are disturbed by adding random numbers, it is expected that at least 60% of the results and visited paths are the same.
PROBLEM FORMULATION

System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , the system model we considered in this paper contains three parts: the data owner, the data user and the cloud server. The data owner uploads document collection D to the cloud server, but this collection may contain sensitive information. To protect data privacy, the data owner has to encrypt D before outsourcing it to the cloud server. Furthermore, in order to enable the cloud server to process query efficiently over the encrypted document collection C, the data owner constructs an encrypted searchable index I e locally. Finally, the data owner outsources both the encrypted document collection C and the encrypted searchable index I e to cloud, and shares the secret key of trapdoor generation and document decryption to authorized data users with secure channels.
When the data user wants to search with a query, s/he generates the trapdoor T for this query firstly by query encryption, and then submits the trapdoor to cloud server for query processing. After receiving T , the cloud server calculates the relevance scores between trapdoor T and the documents in index I e , and returns k documents with the highest scores to the data user.
Note that, the search control is outside the scope of our paper. Therefore, similar to works [16] , [22] , [27] , [31] , [32] , we assume data users are trusted entities and the trapdoors are generated by data users themselves.
Threat Model
In this paper, we treat data owner and data user as trusted entities, but cloud server is considered to be "honest-butcurious" as adopted in most works on secure cloud data search. The server is honest as it runs the programs and algorithms correctly, it is curious since the cloud service providers can easily access and analyze the encrypted data, and even record queries to learn additional information. Based on the information which can be learned by cloud sever, we consider two threat models as [15] , [31] .
Known Ciphertext Model. This threat model corresponds to the ciphertext-only attack, as the cloud server [14] , [15] , [16] , [30] , [33] .
Preliminaries
Multi-keyword top-k Search
Let D be the plaintext document collection that the data owner will outsource to cloud servers, and D i represents a document in D. W is a dictionary and Score(Q, D i ) is the relevance score between query Q and document D i (the mainly used notations in this paper are summarized in Table  1 ). The multi-keyword top-k search [17] is used to find the k documents with the highest relevance scores to query Q, the formal definition is given as follows: 
e.g., document collection D has four documents, as shown in documents D 1 and D 4 are the top 2 documents, as their scores are higher than others.
Vector Space Model and TF×IDF
Vector space model [34] and TF×IDF [17] 
Here 
Design Goals
Our goals contain three aspects: 1) Supporting multikeyword top-k similarity search over encrypted data; 2) Search with high efficiency; 3) Privacy-preserving. The details are listed as below:
Multi-keyword top-k Search: To design a searchable encryption scheme that enables the cloud server to support multi-keyword top-k similarity search over encrypted data;
Search efficiency: Our scheme should be efficient in index construction, trapdoor generation and search processing, and it should be more efficient and effective than the state-of-the-art methods; Privacy-preserving: Our scheme should protect the privacy of indexes and queries at the same time. They are
•
Index security and Query security:
The plaintext information of encrypted searchable index and trapdoor should be protected.
• Keywords Privacy: The cloud server cannot identify whether a certain keyword is contained in a query by analyzing indexes or search results. 
• Query Unlinkability and Access Pattern: The cloud server cannot distinguish whether two identical trapdoors are from the same query, which needs us to hide the visiting paths on index and access pattern of query, where access pattern represents the available information in search results [15] . In RTRA, giving two identical queries, their visiting paths in index and search results can be different, but maintain the accuracy of queries unchanged. The main idea is as follows: 1) enlarging the whole document collection E times, hence each document in result has E options; 2) assigning a switch to each document; 3) building a tree-based index for the whole document collection, where document identifiers are stored in leaf nodes. 4) assigning a random key to each query. Therefore, data users can control the visiting paths and search results by assigning different keys. Next, we further discuss the details of RTRA.
THE RANDOM TRAVERSAL ALGORITHM
RTRA Framework
Enlarging Document Collection
Firstly, the documents in collection D are randomly divided into L groups with the same size, and the divided document collection is represented as
Then, each document group is copied E times and each document is assigned with a unique document identifier. We use DG x to represent the enlarged document collection, where
represents j-th copy of document group DG i . After D is enlarged, each document has E copies and were distributed in different groups. For example, assume L = 2, E = 2 and document collection D has four documents
Notice 1). The order of documents in each group is random (e.g., the order of copy DG This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TDSC.2017.2693969, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
). The reason is that if the order of two group copies are the same, visiting path in the low levels of index may be the same. 2). For disturbing the visiting path of query on index, the order of each group in DG x is still selected randomly, such as the order of DG x could be {DG If two documents belong to the same group and they will be assigned with the switches that have the same form, otherwise they are different. switch j i represents the switch of these documents which belong to document group DG j i and it is calculated as follows:
Where κ = 1, 2, ..., r. θ and τ are two positive integers, and they are set to 5 and 10 in this paper. Rand() is a random number generator and |Rand()| is its absolute value.
Building Index
We build a binary tree I for document collection DG x as index, where document identifiers are stored in leaf nodes. Let N represents a node in I, and we denote its form as ⟨f id, l c , r c , switch⟩. If N is a leaf node, f id is the document identifier, l c and r c are null. Otherwise, f id is null, l c and r c point to its left and right child, respectively. If the children of node N have the same switch form, we add node N to the document group where its children belong to, furthermore, we calculate the switch of this node by Equation 2. Otherwise, all the bits of the switch are set to zero.
Assigning Keys
For getting different visiting paths and search results when processing a query at two different periods, the query is assigned with a random key, where the key is a vector with the same length as switches and represented as key. When generating a key, data user selects one dimension from each E dimensions of key, and the selected dimensions are set to zero, while the others are set to different random negative integers. The reason is that each document has E copies, but when processing search, the cloud server only needs to traverse one copy. The traversed copy is controlled by the values of key, if key[i * E + j] equals to zero then the documents in DG j i will be traversed (where i in [1, L] and j in [0, E − 1]). The value of key is defined as below: Where κ = 1, 2, ..., r, j = f loor(κ/E). ω j is a random integer in [0, E − 1] which represents the selected dimension by the data user. For example, if we assume L = 2, E = 2, and the divided document collection is DG = {DG 1 , DG 2 }. Thus, the key is a vector of length 4 and each document has two copies. Where key [1] , key [2] , key [3] and key [4] are used to control the document groups DG 
Query Processing
Search starts from the root to the leaf nodes in the tree. For any node N , only when key · switch ≥ 0 can the cloud server continues to walk along this node. As shown in have the same content. Therefore, for two identical queries with different keys, the cloud server may visit different paths and return different results, but their query accuracies are the same.
Analysis
We have introduced the unencrypted RTRA, but for the concern of more strict security guarantee, the following analysis is based on the encrypted RTRA (the encryption method will be introduced in next section) such that an adversary cannot distinguish two copies just rely on their ciphertext.
Functionality and Information Leakage
When processing queries in the index, if the switch of one node is zero, then this node will be always traversed by the cloud as its product with any key always equals to zero. On the contrary, if the product is less than zero, this node and its children will be pruned. Therefore, to reduce the number of traversed nodes, we try to keep the neighboring leaf nodes in the index to have the same switch form. Thus when building index, these documents come from one group are assigned with the same switch form. Although the above method may expose the grouping information, the adversaries (cloud servers) cannot identify which copies are from one certain document, since the documents order in each group is randomly assigned. Furthermore, since each switch and key contains a set of different random numbers, thus the product of one key with different switches or the product of one switch with different keys are different. Therefore, adversaries cannot directly identify the copies of one certain document by comparing the products.
In addition, document collection D is divided into L groups and each group is copied E times. Therefore, a data user can generate E L different keys, thus the expectation of the same document in the query result with different keys is | Re|/E, where | Re| is the size of search results. It is obviously that the more number of different documents in two search results, the more difficult for adversaries to judge whether the two queries come from the same request or not. Therefore, the data owner can raise the level of security strength by increasing the value of E.
Space Consumption
The storage space occupied by RTRA is E times of original index, as the value of E increases, the space consumption also becomes larger. Thus, there is a trade-off between space and security, but with the rapid development of computer hardware, the space will not be the main problem. However, an approach to reduce the size of indexes is also introduced in the next section.
THE SCHEME OF GMTS
In this section, we first introduce the unencrypted group multi-keyword top-k search scheme (UGMTS), which is designed to support multi-keyword top-k similarity search over encrypted data and to improve query efficiency. Then, we describe the EGMTS which is an encrypted variation based on UGMTS.
UGMTS
The UGMTS framework involves three parts: 1) Building searchable index locally; 2) Query construction based on the search interests of data users; 3) Search processing in cloud.
Building Index
A data owner builds a searchable index I in local before outsourcing the data to cloud. The index I contains two index groups, that is I = {IC, IR}, where IC is used to select effective candidate documents, and IR is used to calculate the final relevance scores between queries and candidate documents. The details are as follows.
Firstly, the data owner creates an inverted index V for the dictionary W , the inverted index consists of a set of inverted lists and it is denoted as V = {vl(w 1 ), vl(w 2 ), .., vl(w n
Note that, we have adopted the champion lists to our scheme as each inverted list only stores the top c * k documents of each corresponding keyword, which can improve query efficiency and save storage space, but it may also result in lower query accuracy. However, data owners can control the side-effect by adjusting the value of c (in this paper, c is set to 1, in performance analysis we show that c has limited impact on query accuracy).
Secondly, the data owner divides dictionary W into multiple groups as Thirdly, the data owner builds a keyword balanced binary tree [16] as index for each keyword group from the corresponding top-ck documents (e.g. IC i is the index of keyword group W G i , and it is built from V G i ). is the same as QC in UGMTS. Finally, the data user submits query group Q to the cloud server.
Query Construction
Query Processing
The details of search procedure in cloud servers are shown in Algorithm 1. When the cloud server receives query Q. Firstly, it processes QC on index group IC to get the candidate documents CList. Note that, each query in QC is only processed on its corresponding index (e.g. the query QC i only be processed on index IC i ). The relevance scores between QC i and the nodes of IC i are calculated by Equation 5.
Secondly, the cloud server uses Equation 6 to calculate the final relevance scores between query group QR and the documents in CList on the index group IR, and returns k documents with the highest scores to the data user as results. An example is shown in Fig. 5 . for query QC i in query group QC do 3: FINDTOPK(QC i , root of IC i , 0, k) 4: Merge top-k documents list i of QC i into CList 5: end for 6: for document D i in CList do 7: if Score(QR, IR i ) > k-th score in Re then 8: Insert i into Re 9: end if 10: end for 11: return top-k documents of Re 12: end function 13: 14: function FINDTOPK(QC i , node, sco, k) 15: if sco < k-th score in list i then 16: return 17: end if 18: if node is leaf node then 19: Insert the f id of node into list i . if leftScore > rightScore then 24: FINDTOPK(QC i , node.l c , lef tScore, k) 25: FINDTOPK(QC i , node.r c , rightScore, k) 26: else 27: FINDTOPK(QC i , node.r c , rightScore, k) 28: FINDTOPK(QC i , node.l c , lef tScore, k) 29: end if 30: end if 31 : end function
Score(QR, IR
i ) = ∑ QRj ∈QR (QR j ) · (IR i .val j )(6)
EGMTS
The UGMTS is efficient but less effective in privacy preservation for both data owners and data users. Therefore, for protecting the real value of indexes and queries, we add some phantom terms and random values into them to disturb the real relevance scores, and adopt the secure kNN algorithm [32] to encrypt them. The framework of the encrypted group multi-keyword top-k search scheme (EGMTS) is as follows:
Setup(d, u, r):
The data owner generates two secret keys sk 1 
BuildIndex(D, W, d):
The method of building index I (where I = {IC, IR}) follows the same procedure as in UGMTS. Except that, some phantom terms are added into all the data vectors of index I, the details are: 
The data owner also encrypts IR with secret key sk 2 , where the encryption method is the same as encrypting IC. We use IR to represent the encrypted IR. Finally, the data owner outsources IC, IR and the encrypted document collection C to cloud.
CreateQuery(W q , key).
The method of generating query groups QC and QR is similar to the UGMTS. However, the query vectors in QC and QR need to be extended, and the details are: 
., u).
Besides, the first d + u dimensions of each vector are multiplied by a random positive number γ.
Extending QR:
Before extending QR, a phantom query QR b+1 which contains a vector of r + u + 1 dimensions was added to QR by data users. Moreover, to improve the query accuracy such phantom terms are only added into this phantom query. When calculating final relevance score, the cloud servers need to treat all the queries in QR as a whole, thus we add a number of r dummy keywords into each query and restrict their summation to be zero, which means that the stored vectors of the first b queries are extended to d + r, and the values of extended dimensions satisfy the requirement such as
r).
Note that, the above restriction is used to prevent the cloud servers from learning the final relevance scores between candidate documents and any single query, if the cloud server processes QR as a whole, it will get the real score, since the summation of all dummy keywords is zero. Otherwise, the final score will be the real score plus the score of partial dummy keywords. In addition, the (r + j)-th dimension of query vector QR b+1 is set to random number ξ j (where j = 1, ..., u) and the (r + u + 1)-th dimension is set to a random positive number λ. Finally, all the query vectors in the query group QR are scaled by a random positive number γ except the last dimension.
EncryptQuery(QC, QR, key).
After query groups QC and QR are generated, the data user encrypts them with secret keys sk 1 (where j = 1, ..., d + u + 1) . Finally the query group QC is encrypted as below:
The data user also uses secret key sk 2 to encrypt QR with the same method applied to QC. In the end, the data user submits < QC, QR > to the cloud server as trapdoor where QR denotes the encrypted QR.
Query( QC, QR, IC, IR, k).
The query processing method over the encrypted index groups IC and IR is similar to UGMTS, except the relevance scores between the nodes of index IC i and query QC i are calculated by Equation 7 , and the score between the query group QR and index IR ρ is calculated by Equation 8 .
Where N i represents a node in index IC i , M 
Score( QR, IR
ρ ) = ∑ QR i ∈ QR ( IR ρ .val ′ i ) · ( QR ′ i ) + ( IR ρ .val ′′ i ) · ( QR ′′ i ) = γ(Score(QR, IR ρ ) + u ∑ j=1 ξ j ) + λ
Security Analysis
In this paper, we do not discuss the security of document collection, because it is encrypted by the data owner before outsourcing to the cloud server, and the encryption method could be any traditional encryption method that is suitable for the concern of data owners. Hence, we assume the encryption methods are secure and can guarantee strong data privacy. Next, we analyze the security of our scheme in known ciphertext model and known background model, respectively. Number of documents Similarity Score
The distibution for =0.1 Fig. 6 . The distribution of similarity score for keyword "network" with different values of σ.
In Known Ciphertext Model
Adversaries can calculate the real value of indexes and queries by establishing liner equations from the exposed ciphertext [15] . Assume IC i represents an index in the index group IC, and it is encrypted by the secure kNN algorithm with secret key sk 1 , where each data vector is randomly split into two different vectors. The number of equations that established from the ciphertext of this index is 4βm(d+u+1), where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. But index IC i contains 2βm nodes and 2(d+u+1) unknown numbers in each node, there also have 2(d + u + 1) 2 unknown numbers in matrices M 1,i and M 2,i . It is obvious that the size of unknowns numbers is more than the known equations. Similarly, for the index group IR and trapdoor, the number of unknown numbers is also more than the known equations. Hence, adversaries have no sufficient equations to calculate the plaintext of indexes and trapdoors without secret key sk 1 and sk 2 .
According to Yao et al. [35] , the secure kNN algorithm is not secure against the chosen-plaintext attack. But next we prove our EGMTS is secure.
Proof: Yao et al. use the known plaintext-ciphertext pair of queries to construct linear equations to calculate the values of index, but in our scheme, the relevance score learned by the cloud server is
where Score(QC i , N i ) is real score, but it is disturbed by 2 + u random numbers (two random numbers γ and λ i , u random numbers ξ i,j ), which means that even for two identical queries, the relevance scores are different. Besides, each linear equation may introduce 2 + u unknown random numbers, therefore the unknowns in equations are always more than the number of linear equations, so adversaries cannot calculate the real value of index, and also cannot infer the real value of secret key.
In summary, the EGMTS is strong enough to protect the security of index and query in known ciphertext model, and it is more secure than the secure kNN algorithm.
In Known Background Model
In the known background model, cloud servers have more knowledge about the stored data, such as the normalized TF distribution of some keywords, therefore, the cloud server can identify these keywords by comparing the normalized TF distributions [14] , [15] , [16] , [30] , [33] . In addition, cloud server may learn the search interests of data users by linking queries and exploiting access pattern.
Keyword Privacy: In EGMTS, keyword privacy can be guaranteed by inserting random numbers ξ i,j and ξ j into queries to obscure the normalized TF distributions. Moreover, random numbers ξ i,j and ξ j follow the uniform distribution U (µ ′ − δ, µ ′ + δ). According to the central limit theorem, the ∑ ω j=1 ξ i,j and
2 ) (where 2ω = u, µ = uµ ′ /2 and σ 2 = uδ 2 /6). As shown in Fig. 6 , the bigger is the value of σ, the higher is the level of interference, but the lower is the query accuracy. Therefore, data users can balance the trade off between query accuracy and keyword privacy by adjusting the value of σ.
Query Unlinkability: In EGMTS, even though each query only contains one keyword, it is also represented as a fixedlength vector. Hence, the cloud server cannot determine which keywords the data user wants to search. In addition, each query vector is randomly split into two different vectors which are encrypted before processing, and the relevance scores are also disturbed by inserted random numbers. Hence, the cloud server cannot distinguish even the same search request just rely on ciphertext and relevance scores. Moreover, according to [14] , data users can control the level of query unlinkability by adjusting the value of phantom terms.
However, the cloud server can link two queries by comparing and analyzing the access pattern and visiting paths on the index. Even though the relevance scores and visiting paths are obscured by inserting random numbers, the accuracy of queries usually get reduced with the increasing interference, which is impractical. To better ensure the system availability, the accuracy of queries cannot be too low. But with the increase of query accuracy, the access pattern and visiting paths of two identical queries are becoming more similar (e.g., in order to guarantee the correct ratio is above 80%, two identical queries must share at least 60% common results and visiting nodes). Hence, the EGMTS and EMTS [14] , MRSE II [15] and EDMRS [16] cannot perfectly protect the query unlinkability.
THE SCHEME OF RGMTS
In Section 4 we have introduced the random traversal algorithm which can change the visiting paths and search results of two identical queries by using different keys. In last section we also have introduced that EGMTS has weakness in query unlinkability protection, since the cloud server can link two queries by comparing and analyzing their visiting paths and search results. In this section, we propose a random group multi-keyword top-k search scheme (RGMTS) which absorbs the advantages of both RTRA and EGMTS, and provides more data security than EGMTS.
Building RGMTS Index
First, the data owner enlarges the document collection D to DG x and assigns a random switch to each document, where the method is the same as RTRA. For example, when both E and L are set to 2, the document collection
Then, similar to the index construction in GMTS, the data owner divides all the keywords in dictionary W into several keyword groups and finds the top-ck documents of each word group. But in RGMTS, all the top-ck document groups are further extended, such as that V G i is extended to V C x i where V G i is the top-ck documents of keyword group W G i , and V C x i is a subset of DG x which contains all the copies of documents belong to V G i . Note that, the documents that belong to V G x i keep the same order as DG
x . e.g., keyword group W G 1 contains two keywords {a, b} and its top-ck documents are
x . The data owner uses the extended top-ck documents to build a searchable index for each keyword group, by using the method which has been applied to EGMTS. For instance, the data user uses V G = 1, ..., r) , and the e-th dimension is set to 1. The data owner also builds an index group IR for document collection DG x , where the switch is stored in the added data vector. Finally, the data owner encrypts collection DG x , index groups IC and IR, and sends them to cloud.
Search Process of RGMTS
When the data user wants to search with keyword set W q , s/he constructs two query groups QC and QR using the method which is similar to EGMTS, except that:
1. The query vector in query group QC is extended from (d + u + 1) to e; 2. Each query of QC is assigned a random key, and these keys are stored in the (d + u + 1)-th dimension to (d + u + r)-th dimension of each vector. 3. The data user assigns a random key to the phantom query in the query group QR.
The data user encrypts QC and QR, and sends them to cloud as trapdoor T . When processing the query QC i , which represents a query of QC, the cloud server calculates the relevance scores between QC i and the nodes of index IC i from the root to the leaf, but only when the score of one node is larger than zero, its children nodes will be traversed. After that, the cloud server merges all the results into CList as candidate documents and calculates the relevance scores between the documents in CList and the query group QR. Finally, the cloud server returns k documents with the highest relevance scores to the data user as search results.
Security Analysis
The RGMTS takes the advantage of RTRA which make sure that if the data user submits two identical queries with different keys, our search procedure in the cloud server must have different visiting paths and results, and in the meantime it maintains the accuracy of queries unchanged. In addition, it is easy to conclude that the probability of getting the same query results and visiting paths of two identical queries is less than 1/E L , and the expectation of the number of common documents between the two search results is less than | Re|/E. Therefore, we can control the level of query unlinkability by adjusting the value of E and L, and without sacrificing the correct ratio.
In order to completely hide access pattern and visiting paths, which requires the probability of getting the same results and visiting paths of two identical queries must be less than or equal to that the probability of two different queries. Therefore, the value of E would be very large, but with the increasing of value E, the index space is also becoming larger (even though we can decrease the storage space by only store the top-ck documents), thus data owners have to balance the trade-off between data security and storage space by adjusting the value of E.
In summary, the RGMTS trades space for data security, which can better protect the query unlinkability and access pattern than most existing works (such as [14] , [15] , [16] ).
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first describe the experimental setup and scenarios, then we analyze the performance of our schemes from two aspects: 1) the precision and privacy; 2) the efficiency of index construction, trapdoor generation and query processing. As one reference point, for query efficiency, we compare the time cost of our solution with the approach EDMRS as proposed in [16] , which represents the latest research finding with high query efficiency.
System Implementation
The overview of our system is shown in Fig. 1 , the main functions of three module are briefly summarized as follow: 1) the data owner encrypts raw collection D to get encrypted version C, and builds searchable index I e based on C; 2) the data user encrypts the query to construct trapdoor T , by using the key as shared by the data owner, and get the encrypted query results from the cloud server; 3) the cloud server stores the outsourced C and I e from the data owner, it traverses the index to process encrypted queries, and returns those documents with top-k highest scores. To test the performance of our schemes, we implement our system based on GMTS and RGMTS. In particular, the former two modules are implemented with C language and Python on a Windows 10 PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU 3.30GHz and 4 Gigabyte memory. The cloud server module is implemented with C language on a Linux Server with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5620 Processors 2.40GHz and 24 Gigabyte memory. For convenience and fairness, we implement EDMRS and MRSE on the same programming languages and platform as that of GMTS and RGMTS. Dataset: We randomly select 12000 emails as our collection D from a publicly available real-life data set: the Enron Email Data Set [36] . In addition, we randomly extract 12000 keywords from these emails as our dictionary with Python, where each keyword is processed by Porters stemming algorithm [37] which excludes the stop words.
Precision and Privacy
Without loss of generality, we adopt the definition of "precision" from [15] , in which precision P k is defined as
where k ′ is the number of real top-k documents in query results.
As described in Section 5.1.1, to decrease the size of indexes and improve the query efficiency, we adopt champion lists to our schemes, where each index only stores the top-ck documents of its corresponding keyword group. It is obvious that the previous methods may result in lower accuracy of queries. However, the data user in our scheme can control the query accuracy by tuning c. As shown in Fig. 7 that the larger value of c is, the higher is the precision we get. Fig. 7 also indicates that c has only limited impacts when its value beyond a certain point, that is because most of the top-k documents in a multi-keyword query appear in the union of search results for one single keyword query.
The works [14] , [15] , [16] are not designed to protect access pattern, and they only add random number ξ j into index or queries to control the level of query unlinkability. However, as we know the adversaries can link two queries by comparing and analyzing the access pattern, thus these works cannot protect the query unlinkability perfectly. In our work, we not only adopt random numbers to control the query unlinkability, but we also proposed RTRA to hide the access pattern. Although the access pattern is hard to hide thoroughly, we can reduce its leakage and increase the difficulty of cloud servers to link two identical queries. One obvious observation is that if the number of common documents between the query results of two identical queries becomes smaller, then it will be more difficult for cloud servers to distinguish from these two queries. Hence, we define the level of query unlinkability as
′′ is the number of common documents between the two query results. In RGMTS, we know that the number k ′′ for two identical queries decreases as the value of E increases. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 8(a) , the level of query unlinkability of RGMTS is increased with larger E, but EDMRS [16] and MRSE [15] do not have such property. On the other hand, to protect the privacy of keyword in the query, random number ξ j was added to each query, which can directly affect the query precision. Fig. 8(b) shows the influence of ξ j on precision, where ξ j follows the normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ), and σ is the standard deviation.
Efficiency
Index construction
The procedure of index construction can be divided into two steps: 1) building a tree-based index group IC for all the keywords and constructing an index IR for document collection D; 2) encrypting all nodes in the indexes with secret keys sk 1 or sk 2 . As introduced in previous section, when building the index IC, each index only stores the top-ck documents of its corresponding keyword group. Therefore, the above operation only generates O(βmb) nodes, where β is a decimal which is less than or equal to 2. On the other hand, our scheme generates O(mb) nodes when building index IR. Overall, there are totally O(θmb) nodes will be generated during the index construction, where θ = 1 + β.
Node encryption needs a splitting process and two multiplications of e × e matrix, where e is the length of vector in each node, which equals to in this paper, we compare our schemes with EDMRS, which is more efficient than MRSE [15] and other methods. The time complexity of EDMRS is O(n 2 m). It is obvious that our schemes are mainly influenced by e, but EDMRS is proportional to the square of n, where n = |W |. On the other hand, the index of EDMRS is encrypted by two n × n matrices, which is time-consuming. But the indexes of our schemes are encrypted by several e × e matrices, where e is smaller than n. So, our schemes usually spend less time in encrypting the indexes. As shown in Fig. 9 , our schemes are more efficient than EDMRS in index construction. Table 2 shows the storage overhead of our indexes (m = 4000, E = 2 and c = 1).
Create Trapdoor
In EDMRS, no matter how many keywords are contained in the query W q , the length of trapdoor is always equal to the size of dictionary, where the trapdoor is a vector. However, in most of the time, people are likely to search just with five keywords or less [14] , [38] . Therefore, most dimensions of the trapdoor are equal to 0, which wastes the computing resources greatly. In our schemes, the trapdoor is divided into b parts, like the dictionary W , and each part is called a query which is a vector with length d. If all dimensions of a query are equal to 0, we remove it from the trapdoor. For example, assume our dictionary W contains n = 8000 keywords, and we divide it into b = 100 groups where each group contains d = 80 keywords. If the size of W q is 5, then the generated trapdoor at most contains 5 queries, where each query includes one 80-dimensional vector. Therefore, the total length of our trapdoor is 400 at most, but the length of the trapdoor in EDMRS is 8000. Hence, in our schemes, the data user can take less time in trapdoor encryption. The time complexity of trapdoor construction in both GMTS and RGMTS are O(te 2 ), where t is the number of queries in trapdoor. In the worst case, t equals to the size of W q . Obviously, the time complexity is independent of the size of dictionary, and it is only affected by the size of vectors in queries and the size of trapdoor. In Fig. 10 , we can observe that our proposed scheme significantly outperforms the EDMRS in trapdoor construction.
Search
We improve query efficiency in three ways: 1) we build a searchable index for each keyword group instead of the whole dictionary; 2) each index only stores the top-ck documents of its corresponding keyword group; 3) every index is structured as a keyword balanced binary tree.
As mentioned above, the data user divides the original query into several queries and only sends non-empty queries to the cloud server. Therefore, with the first method, the cloud server does not need to search the indexes of all keyword groups. On the other side, the number of nodes in indexes was decreased with the second method, which avoid excessive search on extraneous nodes. Besides, with the third method, when we calculate the relevance scores between any node and queries, if the score of one node is less than the minimum score in CList, then its children nodes will not be traversed, thus many nodes could be pruned during our traversal process. With these methods, the overall computational cost is greatly reduced in our search procedure, and in the meantime we can guarantee the query privacy. Because the number of keywords in a query can be ranged from 1 to d, the cloud server cannot identify which keywords the data user wants to search.
We compare the query efficiency of our methods with EDMRS under different parameter settings. In particular, we study m (dataset size), t (query size), n (dictionary size) and the effect of k (parameter k in our top-k query) on real datasets. All results in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 demonstrate that our methods are much more efficient in search time. In particular, Fig. 12(a) shows that the query time of each method increases with k since they all need more time to process the data. Similarly, both figures in Fig. 11 show that the query time of each algorithm increases with m and t, respectively. On the other hand, the time cost of query in our methods is independent of the dictionary size. So, as shown in Fig. 12(b) , the efficiency of query in EDMRS drops sharply with the increased size n of dictionary, but our methods still maintain high efficiency.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on improving the efficiency and the security of multi-keyword top-k similarity search over encrypted data. At first, we propose the random traversal algorithm which can achieve that for two identical queries with different keys, the cloud server traverses different paths on the index, and the data user receives different results but with the same high level of query accuracies in the mean time. Then, in order to improve the search efficiency, we design the group multi-keyword top-k search scheme, which divides the dictionary into multiple groups and only needs to store the top-ck documents of each word group when building index. Next, to protect the query unlinkability, we apply the random traversal algorithm to get the RGMTS, which can increase the difficulty of cloud servers to conduct linkage attacks on two identical queries, and we can also tune the value of E to make the level of query unlinkability flexible for data owners. Finally, the experimental results show that our methods are more efficient and more secure than the state-of-the-art methods.
